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Abstract— Evacuation systems have always played a crucial 
part when designing a transport system. The cornerstone of 
these systems is to get people to safety in the quickest and 
safest way possible. When it comes to marine systems, the 
requirements greatly differ in comparison to those on land and 
in air. On a day with highly inclement and fierce weather, in 
the middle of the ocean, getting the crew to safety through a 
chute or a slide would expose the crew to ferocious danger. 
Thence, the proposed Puffle-Pod Evacuation System 
introduces a more protected and secure evacuation without 
putting the lives of the crew at a high risk. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Within the last few decades there have been vast changes in 
evacuation systems and styles of marine vehicles from 
buoys and (inflatable) boats to life-rafts [1][3][5] and 
hyperbaric lifeboats [6].  
The first Marine Evacuation System (MES) invented in 
1979 by RFD was a milestone for marine safety [2][8]. 
Their current generation of MES allows a highly rapid and 
safe evacuation of 860 passengers in less than 30 minutes 
[9]. It is a great success of pace considering the rate of 
people leaving the ship per minute. The MESs currently in 
use are -as explained in further detail in the Related Work 
section- very vulnerable to natural misfortunes. 
The main purpose of this paper is to propose a safer and 
more secure evacuation. The proposed evacuation system, 
called POMES, introduces a new style of evacuation by 
presenting pods which encapsulate and isolate the personnel 
inside, in order to provide as much protection as possible. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly 
introduces the concept of the existing systems on market. 
The novel proposal of the paper is described in Section III 
respectively. Section IV concludes this paper by contrasting 
briefly the existing systems and POMES. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The probability of survival in an emergency needs to be 
very high for a naval evacuation system. There are various 
companies which provide evacuation systems for marine 
vehicles. These companies provide off-the-shelf systems but 
offer numerous choices by making them suitable for 
common types of marine vehicles. The evacuation systems 
provided by these organisations mainly consist of inflatable 
rafts which are also called life-rafts [1][2][3]. Some of these 
rafts are used by different navies across the world [1]. 
Ostensibly, all the systems use inflatable rafts for evacuation 
so far. These systems get the crew off the ship through a 
slide or a chute, which is inflated by a member of the crew 
by the pull of a handle as soon as the alarm is activated [1]
[2][3][4][5][7]. These systems depend entirely on inflating 
those rafts/boats. These life-rafts are safer in contrast to 
lifeboats which are deployed more commonly in MESs, 
since they are made with high resistant fibres [2].  
Survitec and other famously known providers of evacuation 
systems provide more than one system depending on the 
demands and suitability [1][5][3]. Survitec offer 6 groups of 
Marine Evacuation Systems depending on the size and 
speed of the vessel [1]. Wärtsilä, another well-known 
company for MESs, have similar systems as Survitec with a 
few different features [3]. Yet, as mentioned earlier, these 
systems use either chutes or slides with inflatable life-rafts. 
Using chutes or slides may cause injuries -due to landing 
and sliding positions [15] which eventually affects the safety 
of these systems.  
III. PUFFLE-POD 
A. System Introduction 
The puffle-pod marine evacuation not only provides a more 
secure and safer way to get the crew to evacuate the vessel, 
it also increases the chance of survival of the personnel 
afterwards in the sense of physical and psychological well- 
being. Post evacuation, the sustenance is also provided.  
The purpose of designing the puffle-pods in a way that they 
are accessed from inside the vessel is to protect the crew 
from potentially harmful external happenings. Sustenance 
and additional support for subsistence, such as provision of 
a fishing rod, can be provided inside every pod. Another key 
benefit of using these pods is that the personnel would be 
kept warm and dry, which avoids likeliness of disease 
caused by cold and staying wet.  
Also, having other people inside the pod could support the 
individual by not letting them feeling isolated or alone. The 
personal space provided by the pods greatly decreases 
anxious feelings caused by overcrowdedness. In contrast to 
the existing MESs, POMES grants people the personal 
space they need. The distress 
caused by the discomfort of having 
to let other people be too close 
would proportionally increase with 
time. Thus provision of minimum 
personal space is given by dividing 
45 personnel into 4 pods, in case 
that half the pods are damaged or 
not functioning. Hence in the best 
case scenario, in which the pods 
have only 5-6 people inside, the 
crew are not perturbed by the vile 
feeling of letting other people into 
their personal space. This is only 
an exemplary design. This layout 
can be adjusted for other sizes of 
ships, taking into account relevant 
standards for evacuation of marine 
systems [14]. 
Figure 1 - Deflated 
B. Functionality Description 
The proposed POMES is designed for evacuation of crew of 
navy vessels which have a capacity of 45 personnel. This 
system prepares the pods when evacuation is taking place, 
and leads each person to an empty pod. 
POMES consists of 8 pods on each side of the vessel. Each 
pod has a capacity of 12 personnel at maximum. In normal 
conditions, the pods are deflated in order to make them 
conducive to save space outside the vessel (Figure 1).  
A puffle-pod consists of two ball-like shaped balloons one 
inside the other. The outer balloon is called the shell and the 
other one is called the core (Figure 2). The shell shall be 
made of a tougher and more resistant fibre tissue, in contrast 
to the core, in order to protect the pod from possible bites or 
damage from marine creatures. The material of the shell, 
therefore, shall be made of a lightweight, durable and cut-
resistant material, such as Kevlar [11][17] or auxetic 
Kevlar® [18]. The space between the core and the shell at 
the bottom of the pod is filled with sand, or any other 
material which does not float and considerably heavy but 
flexible, in order to prevent disorientation in the sea; and the 
rest of this space is filled with air. The cover of the core 
shall be made of a material, such as Nomex [10][17][14], 
which is flame resistant and has excellent thermal 
resistance, which would keep the crew warm by protecting 
them from the cold. 
The preparation of pods starts with the activation of the 
main inflators, which consequently activates the pods’ 
individual inflators. The main inflators are more powerful in 
comparison to the pods’ inflators. The reason of this 
implementation is to get the air into the pods as quick as 
possible. 
 
In the event of reaching the right amount of air pressure 
inside a pod, it is signalled to the controller via the pod’s 
pressure sensor that the pod is ready. Consequently,  the 
pod’s inflator is stopped and the pod’s door is unlocked and 
opened. The pressure sensor also sends signals to the floor 
and LED signs of the pod to turn them on (Figure 3). 
Each pod has an LED sign in the vessel and floor lighting 
leading to the pod. These lights get activated whenever a 
pod is ready and get turned on and off according to the pods’ 
availability by the signal coming from pressure sensors of 
the pods. The pods’ doors work in the same way, they get 
locked or unlocked and opened in accordance with the 
preparation of the pods. Thence, the crew are directed 
straight to the prepared pods by these lights. 
The sequence of the whole evacuation event, therefore, shall 
ideally be as follows: 
i- The emergency takes place and the evacuation system 
is triggered. 
ii- The controller receives the signal and sends the signal 
to activate the main inflators. 
iii- All the other inflators get activated. 
iv- When a pod reaches a certain amount of pressure, the 
pressure sensor of the pod then: 
  (a) sends a signal to the controller 
  (b) turns on the floor and LED sign lights 
belonging to the pod 
v- Once the controller receives positive signals from the 
pressure sensors, it unlocks and opens the doors of the ready 
pods. 
vi- The controller turns off the inflators after certain 
amount of time / when it starts to receive signals from 
pressure sensors. 
vii- When the crew decide to separate themselves from the 
vessel, they have to close the vessel’s and the pod’s doors.  
viii- The pods get separated from the vessel manually by of 
the crew inside them. 
ix- Separation from the vessel means that the blockage 
between the battery and the transmitter inside the pod is 
Figure 2 - How pods look like in the vessel Figure 4 - Setting of the floor and LED lights
Figure 3 - Pressure Sensor / Light Connexion
removed. Hence the transmitter starts to transmit S-O-S 
signals upon receiving power. 
x- When a pod separates itself from the vessel: 
  (a) The vessels door is locked by the same 
operation which separates the pod from the vessel 
  (b) The lights which lead to the separated pod are 
turned off in order to prevent misleading the personnel that 
are still inside the vessel. 
C. Technical Description 
The controller is implemented by two microcontrollers. The 
primary microcontroller is called the main microcontroller. 
The main microcontroller and the secondary micro-
controller, called the back-up controller, are connected to 
each other. When the back-up microcontroller stops 
receiving any signal from the main microcontroller, it takes 
control of the system and continues on with the process. 
These microcontrollers are to be positioned oppositely, 
meaning that one has to be at the front and the other at the 
rear of the vessel. It would let the system continue 
functioning if for instance a collision occurs where the main 
microcontroller is positioned. 
As soon as  the evacuation signal is created, it reaches both 
the main microcontroller and the back-up microcontroller. 
The first OR gate on the way to the inflators is put there in 
order to simplify the system. Thus the rest of the system do 
not have to be aware of which microcontroller is in charge. 
The second OR gate’s purpose is to activate the pods’ 
inflators if any of the main inflators are functioning. This is 
to accommodate any failure of either the main inflators. 
The reason for the relay following the OR gate is to multiply 
and to activate the rest of the inflators. Whenever a signal 
reaches the relay, the relay makes the connexion between 
electricity and the rest of the system. Upon receiving a 
current, the rest of the system would be powered on, hence 
the pods’ inflators start working.   
After a certain amount of time all the pods are expected to 
reach the sufficient air pressure. Each pod has a pressure 
sensor in order to monitor the air pressure. These sensors are 
connected to the microcontrollers through an encoder. The 
encoder reduces the number of cables immensely. In the 
case that the encoder is not used, there has to be 16 cables in 
total instead of 6 because every sensor has to be connected 
to both controllers hence we have to double the numbers. 
The connexions between the doors and the microcontrollers 
are done in the same way, using an encoder, for the same 
purpose mentioned earlier. In addition to this, in order to 
control the doors, 3 outputs are produced by the 
microcontroller in charge. Just like the signals encoded into 
3 when delivering the status of the doors to the MCU(micro-
controller unit), the outputs of the microcontroller are 
delivered to a 3 to 8 decoder, and wired to the doors 
accordingly. The doors are controlled by the controller and 
not by pressure sensors like lights, because they have more 
than 2 states and these states have to be monitored and 
handled with scrutiny. 
The pseudocode of these microcontrollers are shown as 
follows (it has to be taken into consideration that all the 
doors are locked as default). 
Main Microcontroller 
function main(evacuationON){ 
  if (evacuationON){ 
    Activate the main inflators 
  } 
  while evacuationON{ 
    listenSensors(signal1, signal2, signal3) 
} 
function listenSensors(signal1, signal2, signal3){ 
  /*All the 8 conditions are to be listed here and 
according to how the wiring is made, the specific 
doors should be unlocked and opened or locked(in 
case of separation, the doors should get locked)*/ 
  if (signal1 is … and signal2 is … and signal3 is 
…){ 
    Unlock and open the doors which are ready 
  } 
Figure 5 - Overall view of POMES
  if (signal1 is 0 and signal2 is 0 and signal3 is 
0){ 
    Do nothing 
  } 
  ... 
} 
Back-Up Microcontroller 
function main(evacuationON, main_mcu){ 
 if(evacuationON and main_mcu is not 1){ 
      Activate the main inflators 
    } 
    while (evacuationON and main_mcu is not 1){ 
      listenSensors(signal1, signal2, signal3) 
 } 
} 
function listenSensors(signal1, signal2, signal3){ 
 /*All the 8 conditions are to be listed here 
and according to how the wiring is made, the 
specific doors should be unlocked and opened or 
locked(in case of separation, the doors should get 
locked)*/ 
 if (signal1 is … and signal2 is … and signal3 
is …){ 
       Unlock and open the doors which are ready 
    } 
    if (signal1 is 0 and signal2 is 0 and signal3 
is 0){ 
      Do nothing 
    } 
    ... 
    All the 8 conditions are to be listed here and 
according to how the wiring is made, the specific 
doors should be unlocked and opened or locked(in 
case of separation, the doors should get locked). 
} 
The separation system on the pod’s side blocks the energy 
current which tries to flow from the battery along way to the 
transmitter(Figure - 6). Upon separation form the vessel, the 
blockage between the battery and the transmitter no longer 
exists, thence the transmitter starts receiving power. 
Consequently, S-O-S signals are transmitted. 
D. Critical Condition Analysis 
In order to establish the safety of the proposed system, the 
recommended techniques in IEC 61508 for Functional 
Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic 
Safety-related Systems [12] (of which POMES is an 
example) and ISO/IEC 12207 for Systems and software 
engineering [13] are used. A major activity is hazard 
identification, followed by risk assessment, leading to risk 
analysis and mitigations for the identified relevant hazards. 
The system suggested here uses many techniques to control 
risks, as explained above. Here, some of the steps, which are 
taken during the design and development process, are 
defined. A full documentation is out of scope for this 
overview paper. 
 a. Hazards 
 a1. POMES not activated. (Intolerable) 
 a2. A pod is not inflated (ALARP) 
 a3. A door of a pod not unlocked. (ALARP) 
 a4. A door of a pod not opened. (ALARP) 
 a5. LED signs or floor lights of a pod not turned 
on._(ALARP)  
 a6. A pod does not detach when released. (Intolerable) 
 a7. Pods’ doors opened when should not. (Intolerable) 
We assess some risks as intolerable, whereas others fall into 
the "as low as reasonably practicable" range. This is because 
the number of pods already provides redundancy, and 
individual failures can be tolerated to a very low degree. 
 b. Causes of the Hazards 
 a1.1 The cable which carries the evacuation signal is 
damaged. OR 
 a1.2 Evacuation signal could not be created due to 
vessel’s system. OR 
 a1.3 The controller is damaged. OR 
 a1.4 The algorithm of the controller is incorrect. 
 a2.1 The main inflator is not working. AND 
 a2.1.1 The cable which carries the signal is 
damaged._OR 
 a2.1.2 The inflator itself is damaged. OR 
 a2.1.3 The controller is damaged. OR 
 a2.1.4 The algorithm of the controller is incorrect. 
 a2.2 The pod's inflator is not working. 
 a2.2.1 The cable which carries the signal is 
damaged._OR 
 a2.2.2 The pod's inflator is damaged. OR 
 a2.2.3 The controller is damaged. OR 
 This applies for a3, a4, and a5 
 a3/4/5.1 Pressure sensor on the pod not working. OR 
 These apply for a3 and a4 
 a3/4.2 The cable which carries the signal from the 
pressure sensor to the encoder is damaged. OR 
 a3/4.3 The encoder is damaged. OR 
 a3/4.4 The cables which carry the signals from the 
encoder to the main controller is damaged. OR 
 a3/4.5 The cables which carry the signals from the 
encoder to the main controller is wired incorrectly. OR 
 a3/4.6 The configuration of the microcontroller is set 
incorrectly. (e.g. reading D0 instead of D1) 
 a6.1 Pod separation button not working due to 
malfunctioning electromechanical (or hydraulic depending 
on the design) components. OR 
 a6.1 Pod separation mechanism not working. 
 a7.1 Wrong wiring of the cables connected to the 
microcontroller which come from the encoder. OR 
 a7.2 Pressure sensor may be malfunctioning and 
sending wrong signals. 
These causes are derived by a simple root cause analysis, 
which should be considered as an example only. 
 c. Mitigations 
 a1.1 Mechanically protect cables and put them in safe 
areas. 
Figure 6 - The system inside the pod
 a1.2 The alarm system is out of scope here. 
 a1.3 Make the main controller redundant and physically 
separate controllers. 
 a1.4 Use diverse software in controllers 
 a2.1 Make the main inflator redundant. 
 a2.2 The main inflators are more powerful than the pod 
inflators. The main inflator alone can inflate pods, but it will 
increase the time of inflation. 
 a3.2 The pressure is also displayed inside the vessel 
near the door and a mechanical alternative is built on the 
door so that the crew can open the door manually. 
 General: 8 pods are provided in order to accommodate 
damage or malfunctioning of up to 4 pods. Half of the pods 
can fail and the personnel are still able to board into the 
remaining pods. 
These are some mitigations possible, which are found in the 
design. More should be done to get a fully safe system. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In the existing systems, the crew is forced to board onto the 
life-rafts or boats through a slide or a chute. In such case, 
the personnel become vulnerable to fierce weather 
conditions by being exposed. Subsequently, these people 
have to cram into life-rafts/boats. In addition to the 
drawbacks of their personal discomfort and stress caused by 
the shock of the events they had been through, they would 
now have to stay uncomfortably squeezed with other people 
until a rescue arrives. These adverse outcomes are also 
mentioned in [16].  
In contrast, POMES is designed to grant ease to the crew 
during and after the evacuation. Most importantly, it is 
designed to protect the personnel by isolating them inside 
pods fully. Hence they are not exposed to any external 
dangers that may come due to bad weather or from marine 
creatures. Moreover, it is designed taking into consideration 
personal space which consequently supports the personnel’s 
psychological well-being. Withal, provision of sustenance 
helps sustaining the crew psychologically and physically. 
Moreover, there is no possibility of injury during boarding 
in POMES unlike vertical chute MES [16]. Even injured 
personnel, if there be any, can board these pods without any 
difficulties. Moreover, members of the crew with phobias 
would not be overwhelmed by the fear of chutes or slides.  
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